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1
1 Introduction
In a celebrated paper, Aumann (1976) established the Agreement Theorem: if two agents
have the same prior belief over possible states of the world, and if their posteriors for
an event are commonly known by both, then these posteriors must be equal. Agents
cannot agree to disagree, and this implies that bets should not take place, other than for
risk-sharing purposes (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982).
Here, we investigate whether (or to what extent) this result extends to the case in
which there is ambiguity, in the sense that prior beliefs of agents are described by a set
of probability measures. Such a setting has been increasingly considered since the work
of Bewley (1986, 1987 and 2002) on Knightian uncertainty, and of Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989) on maxmin expected utility.
Two alternative possibilities for the way in which agents update their priors are con-
sidered: (i) full Bayesian updating; and (ii) maximum likelihood updating. In the first
case, agents update all their priors, while in the second agents only update the maximum
likelihood priors.1
With agents updating all their priors, we present an Agreement Theorem which is
essentially a reformulation of those by Kajii and Ui (2005 and 2009). With respect to
Kajii and Ui (2005, Proposition 3), we replace a somewhat endogenous hypothesis of
connectedness of posteriors by connectedness of priors, and show that it is not necessary
to consider a common set of priors to prevent disagreement. All that is necessary is
that the sets of priors intersect. In fact, the more recent result by Kajii and Ui (2009,
Corollary 12) only requires the sets of priors to be not disjoint. But it also requires the
sets of posterior probability measures to be non-empty, closed and convex. Here, we only
assume that the sets of priors are closed, connected and not disjoint.2
However, under the same hypotheses, if agents are maximum likelihood maximizers,
then it is possible that they agree to disagree. We show this by way of several examples.
In particular, we show that even with a common set of priors and intersecting sets of
likelihood maximizers, the sets of posteriors may be commonly known but disjoint.3 In
the context of maxmin expected utility decision-makers, and with some qualification, this
disjointness of beliefs implies the existence of agreeable bets, as shown by Billot et al.
(2000) and Kajii and Ui (2006).
1 The case of maximum likelihood updating has received little attention in the economic theory
literature, in spite of its wide usage in statistics and econometrics.
2 On the other hand, the Agreement Theorem in Kajii and Ui (2009) is more general in the sense
that it allows for an arbitrary updating rule.
3 The body of literature that followed the seminal work of Aumann (1976) has neglected the search
for cases in which agents actually agree to disagree. This may occur, for instance, in a countable space
of equiprobable states of nature (Correia-da-Silva, 2009).
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2 The model
Let ∆ be the set of all probability measures defined on a finite measurable space (Ω,B),
and let P1 and P2 be two partitions of Ω. Suppose that two sets of probability measures,
∆1,∆2 ⊆ ∆, have the property that if E ∈ P1 ∨ P2, then p(E) > 0 for all p ∈ ∆1 ∪∆2.4
For any ω ∈ Ω, denote by Pi(ω), for i = 1, 2, the event in Pi that contains state ω.
Similarly, let P(ω) be the event in P1 ∧ P2 to which ω belongs. An event E is said to be
common knowledge at ω if (and only if) P(ω) ⊆ E.
The following lemma, whose argument is essentially given by Kajii and Ui (2005),
will be the key step in the general results given later. It may be interpreted as stating
that: if it is common knowledge that the set of an agent’s posteriors is Qi then, the set
of posteriors obtained using only the common information is contained in [inf Qi, supQi].
Lemma 1. Fix an individual i, an event A and a state ω ∈ Ω. Let Q be a nonempty
subset of the interval [0, 1], and let ∆˜ be a nonempty subset of ∆. If the event
{ω˜ ∈ Ω | {q | ∃p ∈ ∆˜ : p(A|Pi(ω˜)) = q} = Q}
is common knowledge at ω, then
{q | ∃p ∈ ∆˜ : p(A|P(ω)) = q} ⊆ [inf Q, supQ].
Proof: By assumption,
P(ω) ⊆
{
ω˜ ∈ Ω |
{
q | ∃p ∈ ∆˜ : p(A ∩Pi(ω˜))
p(Pi(ω˜))
= q
}
= Q
}
.
Since P(ω) ∈ P1 ∧ P2, we can write P(ω) = ∪jP j, for some {P j}j ⊆ Pi, and it follows
that for all j, {
q | ∃p ∈ ∆˜ : p(A ∩ P
j)
p(P j)
= q
}
= Q.
Now, take any p ∈ ∆˜, let inf Q = ql and supQ = qu, and note that, for each j,
ql ≤ p(A ∩ P
j)
p(P j)
≤ qu,
so it is immediate that
ql
∑
j
p(P j) ≤
∑
j
p(A ∩ P j) ≤ qu
∑
j
p(P j),
or, equivalently, that
qlp(P(ω)) ≤ p(A ∩P(ω)) ≤ qup(P(ω)).
This implies that p(A|P(ω)) ∈ [ql, qu], which proves the result. Q.E.D.
4 The notation P1 ∨ P2 is used for the join of the two partitions, which is their coarsest common
refinement. Their finest common coarsening, or meet, shall be denoted by P1 ∧ P2.
3
3 Full Bayesian Updating
Let A be an event. An individual carries out full Bayesian updating5 if she updates all
her priors, given her private information.
The set of posterior probabilities that agent i attributes to the event A, in state ω˜, is
Qi(ω˜) = {q | ∃p ∈ ∆i : p(A|Pi(ω˜)) = q},
that is, q ∈ Qi(ω˜) if, and only if, there is some p ∈ ∆i for which p(A|Pi(ω˜)) = q.
Given a nonempty set Q ⊆ [0, 1], we say that it is common knowledge at state ω that
the set of posteriors of agent i is Q, if the event consisting of all states ω˜ ∈ Ω for which
Qi(ω˜) = Q
is common knowledge at ω.
3.1 An Extension of Aumann’s Theorem
The following proposition extends Aumann’s Theorem (1976) to the case of multiple priors
with full Bayesian updating, strengthening the results of Kajii and Ui (2005 and 2009).
It states that if the two individuals have closed, connected and intersecting sets of priors,
and their sets of posteriors are common knowledge, then they cannot agree to disagree
(in the sense that their sets of posteriors intersect).
Proposition 1 (Aumann’s Theorem). Let ω ∈ Ω, and let Q1 and Q2 be nonempty
subsets of [0, 1]. Suppose that the sets of priors of the two agents, ∆1 and ∆2, are closed
and connected. If for both individuals it is common knowledge at ω that Qi(ω) = Qi, then
{q | ∃p ∈ ∆1 ∩∆2 : p(A|P(ω)) = q} ⊆ Q1 ∩Q2.
Proof: For each individual i, note that the mapping p 7→ p(A|Pi(ω)) is continuous over
∆i, by the assumption that p(E) > 0 for all p ∈ ∆i and all E ∈ P1 ∨ P2.6 Since ∆i is
closed and connected, it then follows that i’s set of posterior probabilities of A at ω,
{q | ∃p ∈ ∆i : p(A|Pi(ω)) = q},
is a closed interval. Moreover, by the assumption that it is common knowledge at ω that
Qi(ω) = Qi, we have that
P(ω) ⊆ {ω˜ ∈ Ω | {q | ∃p ∈ ∆i : p(A|Pi(ω˜)) = q} = Qi},
5 This is also referred to as Fagin-Halpern updating – see Kajii and Ui (2005).
6 This is immediate from the definition of the mapping: p 7→ p(A ∩Pi(ω))/p(Pi(ω)).
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so, since ω ∈ P(ω), we have that
{q | ∃p ∈ ∆i : p(A|Pi(ω)) = q} = Qi,
and, hence, that Qi = [inf Qi, supQi]. By Lemma 1, it follows that if p ∈ ∆i, then
p(A|P(ω)) ∈ Qi. Q.E.D.
3.2 Agreeing to Disagree
The assumptions in Kajii and Ui (2005, Proposition 3) are that the individuals have the
same set of priors, and that the sets of posteriors for an event are closed intervals, while
the related result of Kajii and Ui (2009, Corollary 12), requires the sets of priors to be
not disjoint, and the sets of posterior probability measures to be non-empty, closed and
convex. We only assumed that the sets of priors are not disjoint, and that the sets of
priors are closed and connected.
The following example shows that, without the connectedness condition, Proposition 1
does not hold: agents can agree to disagree even when they share a common set of priors.
Example 1. Let the set of possible states of nature be Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4}; let the common
set of priors, ∆1 = ∆2 = ∆¯, consist of two probability measures, p1 = (
1
2
, 0, 1
2
, 0) and
p2 = (0,
1
2
, 0, 1
2
); and suppose that the information partitions are P1 = {{ω1, ω2}, {ω3, ω4}}
and P2 = {Ω}.
Consider the event A = {ω2, ω3}. We want to show that even though the sets of
priors intersect (fully), and the sets of Bayesian posteriors are both (closed and) common
knowledge at any ω ∈ Ω, these latter sets are disjoint. First, note that for any ω˜ ∈ Ω, we
have that
{q | ∃p ∈ ∆¯ : p(A|P1(ω˜)) = q} = {0, 1},
while
{q | ∃p ∈ ∆¯ : p(A|P2(ω˜)) = q} =
{
1
2
}
.
So, if we let Q1 = {0, 1} and Q2 =
{
1
2
}
, we have that both events
{ω˜ ∈ Ω | {q | ∃p ∈ ∆¯ : p(A|Pi(ω˜)) = q} = Qi}
are common knowledge at any ω ∈ Ω, yet Q1 ∩Q2 = ∅.7
7 It continues to be true that {q | ∃p ∈ ∆¯ : p(A|P(ω)) = q} ⊆ [inf Q1, supQ1] ∩ [inf Q2, supQ2], but
without connectedness this does not guarantee that {q | ∃p ∈ ∆¯ : p(A|P(ω)) = q} ⊆ Qi.
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4 Maximum Likelihood Updating
For each individual, let ∆i(P ) = argmaxp∈∆i p(P ), for each P ∈ Pi. An individual uses
maximum likelihood updating if, at each state of nature, she updates only the priors that
make the information she has received most likely: at state ω, her set of posteriors is given
by the updating of priors that belong to ∆i(Pi(ω)) only.
8 Abusing notation slightly, we
will also write ∆i(ω) for the set ∆i(Pi(ω)).
As before, fix an event A. Unlike in the setting of a Bayesian individual, for one who
uses maximum likelihood updating we cannot define a set of posterior probabilities of A
given the individual’s information partition, for the set of priors that she updates changes
with the event she is informed of. At state ω, the set of posterior probabilities of A is
Qi(ω) = {q | ∃p ∈ ∆i(ω) : p(A|Pi(ω)) = q};
that is, if q ∈ Qi(ω) ⊆ [0, 1], then there is some p ∈ ∆i that maximizes the probability of
observing Pi(ω) over individual i’s set of priors, and for which the posterior for event A,
given i’s information in state ω, is q.
Given a nonempty set Q ⊆ [0, 1], we will say that it is common knowledge at state ω
that the set of posteriors of individual i is Q if the event consisting of all the states ω˜ ∈ Ω
for which Qi(ω˜) = Q is common knowledge at ω.
4.1 Agreeing to Disagree
The following example shows that in the case of individuals who use maximum likelihood
updating, the result of Proposition 1 does no longer hold: under the hypotheses of that
proposition, individuals who use maximum likelihood updating can agree to disagree.
Example 2. Let the set of possible states of nature be Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4, ω5, ω6}, and let
the common set of priors, ∆1 = ∆2 = ∆¯, consist of the union of the two following sets of
probability measures:
∆a =
{
p =
(
0,
1
2
− x, 1
2
− x, 0, x, x
)
, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
2
}
and
∆b =
{
p =
(
1
2
− x, 0, 0, 1
2
− x, x, x
)
, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1
2
}
.
Suppose that the information partitions are P1 = {{ω1, ω2}, {ω3, ω4}{ω5, ω6}} and P2 =
{{ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4}, {ω5, ω6}}.
8 This type of updating is also known as Dempster-Shafer updating.
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In this case, note that when ω ∈ {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4}, the set of likelihood maximizers is
common to both agents:
∆1(ω) = ∆2(ω) =
{(
0,
1
2
,
1
2
, 0, 0, 0
)
,
(
1
2
, 0, 0,
1
2
, 0, 0
)}
.
Moreover, the posteriors for event A = {ω1, ω3} are constant across {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4}, and,
therefore, common knowledge at any ω ∈ A, but, nevertheless, they do not intersect:
Q1(ω) = {0, 1} while Q2(ω) = {12}.9
4.2 An Extension of Aumann’s Theorem
An extension of Aumann’s result is obtained for individuals who use maximum likelihood
updating, if (i) one strengthens the requirement of connectedness of the sets of priors to
convexity, and (ii) further assumes that the sets of likelihood maximizers are commonly
known and intersect. The first assumption is very standard in the literature. For the
second assumption, formally, given a nonempty set ∆˜ ⊆ ∆, we will say that it is common
knowledge at state ω that the set of likelihood-maximizers of individual i is ∆˜ if the event
consisting of all the states ω˜ ∈ Ω for which ∆i(ω˜) = ∆˜ is common knowledge at ω. Under
these extra hypotheses, if the sets of maximum likelihood priors intersect, then so do the
sets of posteriors, if they are both commonly known.
Proposition 2. Let ω ∈ Ω, let Q1 and Q2 be nonempty subsets of [0, 1], and let ∆˜1 and
∆˜2 be nonempty subsets of ∆. Suppose that the sets of priors, ∆1 and ∆2, are closed
and convex. If, for both i, it is common knowledge at ω that agent i’s set of likelihood
maximizers is ∆˜i and that agent i’s set of posteriors for an event A is Qi, then
{q | ∃p ∈ ∆1(ω) ∩∆2(ω) : p(A|P(ω)) = q} ⊆ Q1 ∩Q2.
Proof: The proof resembles the argument given in the case of Bayesian updaters, so some
details can be omitted. For each individual i, note first that the mapping p 7→ p(A|Pi(ω))
is concave over ∆i, so, since ∆i is convex, it follows that i’s set of likelihood maximizers,
∆i(ω), is convex, and then, as in the proof of Proposition 1, that her set of posterior
probabilities of event A,
{q |∃p ∈ ∆i(ω) : p(A|Pi(ω)) = q},
9 To make the example clearer, we sacrificed strict positivity of the probability distributions. The
same result would be obtained with ∆a =
{
p =
(
, 12 − − x, 12 − − x, , x, x
)
,  ≤ x ≤ 12 − 2
}
and with
∆b modified in the same way.
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is a closed interval. Since it is common knowledge at ω that the set of likelihood maxi-
mizers is ∆˜i, we further have that for all ω˜ ∈ P(ω), ∆i(ω˜) = ∆˜i. By Lemma 1, then,
{q |∃p ∈ ∆˜i : p(A|P(ω)) = q} ⊆ [inf Qi, supQi],
which implies that
{q |∃p ∈ ∆i(ω) : p(A|P(ω)) = q} ⊆ Qi,
since it is common knowledge at ω that i’s set of likelihood maximizers is ∆˜i and her sets
of posteriors is Qi. Q.E.D.
Not surprisingly, the hypothesis that the sets of likelihood maximizers intersect is
necessary for the proposition.10
A general characterization for this condition, however, remains an open question. This
characterization is complicated by the fact that these are the sets of maximizers of different
functions over different domains. But if one assumes one of these two features away, it
is easy to see that the structure of the problems gives, at least, partial answers. Suppose
that both individuals have the same set of priors, namely that ∆1 = ∆2 = ∆¯.
11 In this
case, a necessary condition for p ∈ ∆1(ω)∩∆2(ω) is that p must (also) solve the problem
max
p∈∆¯
p (P1(ω) ∪P2(ω)) + p (P1(ω) ∩P2(ω)) .
To see that this is indeed the case, notice that if p ∈ ∆1(ω) ∩∆2(ω), then, by definition,
for any p˜ ∈ ∆¯ it must be true that p(P1(ω)) ≥ p˜(P1(ω)) and p(P2(ω)) ≥ p˜(P2(ω)). But
this means that
p (P1(ω) ∩P2(ω)) + p (P1(ω) \P2(ω)) ≥ p˜ (P1(ω) ∩P2(ω)) + p˜ (P1(ω) \P2(ω)) (1)
and
p (P1(ω) ∩P2(ω)) + p (P2(ω) \P1(ω)) ≥ p˜ (P1(ω) ∩P2(ω)) + p˜ (P2(ω) \P1(ω)) . (2)
If we then add these two inequalities, it follows that for any p˜ ∈ ∆¯, one has that
p (P1(ω) ∪P2(ω)) + p (P1(ω) ∩P2(ω)) ≥ p˜ (P1(ω) ∪P2(ω)) + p˜ (P1(ω) ∩P2(ω)) ,
which gives the result.
On the other hand, sufficient conditions for the sets of likelihood maximizers to in-
tersect are also possible when the sets of priors coincide. For instance, if the setting is
sufficiently symmetric, in the sense that for all p ∈ ∆¯ it is true that p (P1(ω) \P2(ω)) =
p (P2(ω) \P1(ω)), then ∆1(ω) = ∆2(ω). This is because, again by construction, for any
p ∈ ∆1(ω) and any p˜ ∈ ∆¯, one has that Eq. (1) holds, and, hence, by the symmetry
property, so does Eq. (2).
10 This can be seen by considering Example 4 below.
11 And suppose also that B is fine enough to allow for all the sets below to be measurable; for instance,
that B = 2Ω.
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4.3 More Agreeing to Disagree
We now show that the additional hypotheses of Proposition 2 are necessary, by means of
examples.
If the convexity assumption on the sets of priors is replaced by the weaker assumption
of connectedness, we already know that agents may agree to disagree: this was shown in
Example 2.
Example 3 shows that even if the sets of priors are common, the posteriors are com-
monly known and the sets of likelihood maximizers intersect, the sets of posteriors can
be disjoint.
Example 3. Let the set of possible states of nature be Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4, ω5, ω6, ω7, ω8, ω9},
let the common set of priors be ∆1 = ∆2 = ∆¯, for
∆¯ =
{
p =
(
x, x, x, y,
1
3
− x− y, y, 1
3
− x− y, y, 1
3
− x− y
)
;x, y ≥ 0, x + y ≤ 1
3
}
,
and suppose that the information partitions are:
P1 = {{ω1, ω2, ω3}, {ω4, ω5, ω6, ω7, ω8, ω9}}
and
P2 = {{ω1, ω6, ω8}, {ω2, ω3, ω5}, {ω4, ω7, ω9}}.
Consider the event A = {ω2, ω3, ω6, ω7, ω8, ω9}. Depending on the state of nature, the
sets of maximum-likelihood priors of individual 1 are
∆1({ω1, ω2, ω3}) =
{(
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
)}
or
∆1({ω4, ω5, ω6, ω7, ω8, ω9}) =
{
p =
(
0, 0, 0, y,
1
3
− y, y, 1
3
− y, y, 1
3
− y
)
, for 0 ≤ y ≤ 1
3
}
,
but, in any case, her posteriors are the singleton set Q1 = {23}. On the other hand, the
sets of maximum likelihood priors of individual 2 are
∆2({ω1, ω6, ω8}) =
{(
0, 0, 0,
1
3
, 0,
1
3
, 0,
1
3
, 0
)}
,
∆2({ω2, ω3, ω5}) =
{(
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
)}
and
∆2({ω4, ω7, ω9}) =
{(
0, 0, 0, 0,
1
3
, 0,
1
3
, 0,
1
3
)}
.
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In any case, her posteriors for event A are all the singleton set Q2 = {1}. With both Q1
and Q2 constant across the states in A, one has that these sets of posteriors are common
knowledge at ω2, and ∆1(ω2) ∩ ∆2(ω2) 6= ∅, but the two individuals, still, agree to dis-
agree: Q1 and Q2 are disjoint.
Finally, Example 4 will show a case in which agents agree to disagree even though
their information partitions are the same, their sets of priors intersect, and their sets of
posteriors are commonly known. In this case, the result fails because individuals update
disjoint sets of likelihood maximizers; while one should not expect individuals to agree
in such situation, what the example highlights is the possibility that such disagreement
in priors can occur between people whose information partitions are identical and whose
original priors are not disjoint.
Example 4. Taking ∆a and ∆b as defined in Example 2, let ∆1 = ∆
a and ∆2 = ∆
b, and
let agent 2 have the same information as agent 1, with
P1 = P2 = {{ω1, ω2}, {ω3, ω4}, {ω0, ω5}} .
When ω ∈ {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4}, each agent has a single maximum likelihood prior:
∆1(ω) =
{(
0, 0,
1
2
,
1
2
, 0, 0
)}
and
∆2(ω) =
{(
0,
1
2
, 0, 0,
1
2
, 0
)}
.
Their posteriors for the event A = {ω2, ω3} are constant across {ω1, ω2, ω3, ω4} and are, as
before, common knowledge, but are completely opposite: Q1 = {1} while Q2(ω) = {0}.
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